Introduction
This essay aims to critically assess the ideas and arguments presented by James Rachels and J.L. Mackie concerning cultural relativism, subjectivism, and the role of reason in forming moral ideas. Cultural relativism posits that moral values are relative to cultural beliefs and practices, while subjectivism argues that moral values are dependent on individual attitudes. Rachels argues against cultural relativism, claiming that cultural differences cannot prove its validity. Mackie, on the other hand, utilizes cultural differences to support subjectivism. This essay will explore Mackie’s arguments, Rachels’ response, and their differing views on the extent of cultural differences and the fundamental agreement on morality within human communities. Additionally, the essay will analyze the role of reason in shaping moral ideas. Ultimately, it will be argued that Rachels’ position is more compelling, as cultural differences are not enough to justify subjectivism, and human communities share a deeper moral agreement that transcends superficial disparities.
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Thesis Statement
This essay will demonstrate that while Mackie’s use of cultural differences to support subjectivism is noteworthy, Rachels’ critique of cultural relativism as superficial holds more weight. Moreover, Rachels’ view on the role of reason in forming moral ideas aligns more convincingly with the notion that human communities fundamentally agree on certain moral principles.
Mackie’s Argument for Subjectivism
In his seminal work “Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong,” J.L. Mackie presents a powerful argument in favor of moral subjectivism by drawing attention to the diverse moral beliefs and practices across different societies. He contends that if there were objective moral truths, we would expect to see a higher degree of convergence among cultures regarding fundamental moral principles. However, the reality of significant moral variation between cultures suggests that moral values are contingent upon the attitudes and norms of individuals and communities rather than being grounded in any objective reality (Mackie, 2018).
Mackie further emphasizes the “queerness” of objective moral values. According to him, objective moral properties would be fundamentally different from any other properties observed in the natural world. This queer nature makes it implausible to posit the existence of objective moral values, as they would require a unique ontological status that lacks empirical evidence or clear justification (Mackie, 2018).
Additionally, Mackie posits that cultural differences provide evidence against the objectivity of moral values. For example, practices such as honor killings or female genital mutilation, considered morally reprehensible in many Western societies, are accepted and even endorsed in certain traditional societies. Mackie argues that the stark divergence in moral attitudes challenges the notion of an objective moral reality, as objective moral values should be consistent and universal across all societies (Mackie, 2018).
Rachels’ Response to Cultural Relativism
In “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism,” James Rachels agrees with Mackie that cultural differences do exist and that they have an impact on moral beliefs and practices. However, he contends that these cultural differences are superficial and do not necessarily lead to the conclusion of cultural relativism. Rachels argues that while customs and practices may vary significantly between cultures, there are underlying universal moral principles that transcend these differences (Rachels, 2019).
Rachels provides examples to demonstrate that many moral values are shared by diverse societies. For instance, all human cultures recognize the importance of honesty, fairness, and the prohibition of murder. These shared moral intuitions are not mere coincidences; rather, they arise from fundamental human needs and the common human experience (Rachels, 2019).
Moreover, Rachels points out that the existence of cultural differences does not necessarily imply that there are no objective moral values. It is possible that objective moral values exist, but cultural practices and beliefs have obscured our ability to perceive them fully. In this regard, cultural relativism does not provide a definitive refutation of objective moral values; it merely highlights the complexity of discerning them amidst diverse cultural contexts (Rachels, 2019).
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Mackie’s Disagreement with Rachels
J.L. Mackie objects to Rachels’ view of shared moral principles as indicative of objective moral values. Mackie argues that the presence of universally recognized moral virtues can be attributed to shared human nature rather than the existence of objective moral facts. According to Mackie, humans may possess innate psychological dispositions that influence their moral intuitions, which, in turn, leads to shared moral values (Mackie, 2018).
Furthermore, Mackie rejects the notion that shared moral principles indicate the existence of objective moral values, as he believes that these shared values could be the result of a convergence of human interests and needs. For example, the prohibition of murder may be a common feature across societies because it serves to promote social stability and cooperation rather than arising from any objective moral truth (Mackie, 2018).
Assessment
Mackie’s argument for moral subjectivism based on cultural differences raises pertinent questions about the nature of morality and the extent of cultural influence on moral beliefs. However, his use of cultural differences as evidence for subjectivism is not sufficient to dismiss the possibility of objective moral values.
Rachels’ response to cultural relativism is compelling, as it emphasizes the underlying agreement among human communities on certain moral principles. He acknowledges the reality of cultural differences but argues that they do not negate the existence of objective moral values. The fact that different cultures recognize common moral virtues suggests a deeper moral foundation shared by all humanity.
While Mackie makes valid points regarding the “queerness” of objective moral values, Rachels’ assertion that shared moral principles can arise from universal human needs provides a more coherent explanation. The existence of shared moral intuitions does not prove or disprove the existence of objective moral values, but it does suggest the possibility of a common human moral nature that transcends cultural boundaries.
Conclusion
While both Mackie and Rachels present strong arguments, Rachels’ position is more convincing. Cultural differences do not provide sufficient grounds to support subjectivism, and the existence of shared moral principles indicates a deeper, objective moral agreement among human communities. Additionally, reason plays a significant role in shaping our moral ideas, leading us closer to universal moral principles. Therefore, Rachels’ view aligns more convincingly with the notion that human communities fundamentally agree on certain moral principles and that cultural differences are only superficial.
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References
Mackie, J. L. (2018). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin Books.
Rachels, J. (2019). The Challenge of Cultural Relativism. In J. Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (4th ed., pp. 12-21). McGraw-Hill.